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Urban economists understand housing prices with a spatial equilibrium approach that assumes people
must be indifferent across locations.  Since the spatial no arbitrage condition is inherently imprecise,
other economists have turned to different no arbitrage conditions, such as the prediction that individuals
must be indifferent between owning and renting.  This paper argues the predictions from these non-spatial,
financial no arbitrage conditions are also quite imprecise.  Owned homes are extremely different from
rental units and owners are quite different from renters.  The unobserved costs of home owning such
as maintenance are also quite large.  Furthermore, risk aversion and the high volatility of housing pries
compromise short-term attempts to arbitrage by delaying home buying.   We conclude that housing
cannot be understood with a narrowly financial approach that ignores space any more than it can be
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Like the economic study of financial and labor markets, the economic analysis of 
the housing sector relies on ‘no arbitrage’ relationships.  Case and Shiller (1987, 1989, 
1990) were pioneers in the study of housing price dynamics, and they emphasized a 
financial no arbitrage condition where investors earn equal risk-adjusted returns by 
investing in housing or other assets.  Poterba (1984) and Henderson and Ioannides (1982) 
focus on the no arbitrage condition between renting and owning a home.  Alonso (1964) 
and Rosen (1979) examine the implications for housing prices implied by a spatial no 
arbitrage condition where individuals receive similar net benefits from owning in 
different places.    
  The spatial equilibrium condition is at the heart of modern urban economics and 
has enjoyed much success in predicting the distribution of prices and density levels 
within and across metropolitan areas (Muth, 1969;  Roback, 1982).  Yet, this no arbitrage 
condition yields disturbingly imprecise predictions about price levels, at least by the 
standards of financial economics.  Spatial equilibrium models clearly imply that housing 
should cost more in more pleasant climes, but they cannot tell us whether people are 
“overpaying” for California sunshine.  Moreover, the heart of the model lies in spatial 
comparison, so it could never help us understand whether national housing prices are too 
high or too low.  
  In the evaluation of housing price levels, many economists have been drawn to a 
more financial approach that relies on there being no predictable excess return to being an 
owner relative to being a renter.  This approach seems to offers much greater precision 
than the spatial equilibrium approach because it appears to yield clear predictions about 
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renting.  If we know the owner’s income tax bracket and ability to itemize deductions, the 
fraction of leverage on the home, the mortgage interest rate, maintenance and 
depreciation expenses, the risk premium associated with housing, and expected housing 
price growth, then we can compare price and rents to determine whether house prices are 
“too high.”  Recent research in this vein includes Smith and Smith (2004), McCarthy and 
Peach (2004), and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005).   
Case and Shiller (1989) were pioneers in documenting the predictability of 
housing markets.  In their discussion of that predictability, they also rely on a financial no 
arbitrage condition.  Some of their calculations suggest the presence of excess returns for 
investors that run counter to the efficient markets hypothesis.  Thus, a financial approach 
has been used widely in the analysis of housing markets.   
In this paper, we reexamine the strengths and weaknesses of both the spatial and 
financial equilibrium approaches to the analysis of housing markets.  The next section 
argues that the traditional urban framework cannot provide much insight into issues such 
as the appropriateness of price levels.  Section III then turns to the financial approach.  
We first argue that it makes sense to conflate the rent-own no arbitrage relationship with 
the purely financial no arbitrage analysis of Case and Shiller (1989).  In both cases, the 
key prediction of the absence of arbitrage is that there will not be excess predictable 
returns for owning. 
Our primary conclusion, however, is that the empirical (not conceptual) 
robustness of the financial approach is weaker than many may realize.  For example, the  
house price-to-rent ratio predicted by the buy-rent no arbitrage condition is quite sensitive 
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aversion, future price growth, and expected tenure that are difficult to measure 
accurately.  Section III highlights that what we consider to be reasonable variation in the 
parameter values of these variables easily can generate well over 30 percent differences 
in the predicted ratio between house prices and rents. 
  The importance of unobserved factors is highlighted by simultaneously examining 
two financial no arbitrage conditions: a prospective investor in a house must be 
indifferent between becoming a landlord and investing in some other asset; and a 
prospective renter must be indifferent between renting and owning.  As landlords have no 
advantage comparable to the tax shield provided by homeownership, landlords should not 
be willing to pay as much as an owner-occupier for the same unit of housing, at least if 
the landlord has the same maintenance cost and cost of capital as an owner-occupier.  Our 
calculations suggest that itemizing owner-occupiers should be willing to pay about 40 
percent more than landlords for the same property if they both face the same costs.  This 
gap may reflect higher maintenance costs for landlords or higher capital costs for some 
renters, but whatever the true explanation, any reconciliation requires that unmeasured 
attributes account for a 40 percent difference in predicted house price-to-rent ratios. 
Contrasting the user cost of owning to rents also implicitly assumes the direct 
comparability of owned units to rental units and of owners to renters.  However, Section 
IV documents that rental units tend to be very different from owner-occupied units and 
that owners are different from owners in economically meaningful ways.  For example, 
the vast majority of owned units are single-family detached dwellings, while rental units 
are highly likely to be part of a denser multifamily building.  The average owner-
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American Housing Survey (AHS).  In addition, rental and owner-occupied units also often 
are sited in different parts of the metropolitan area.  Rental units tend to be closer to the 
urban core and are more likely to be in less attractive neighborhoods (as evaluated by 
residents surveyed in the AHS).  These spatial differences may impact both the predicted 
level of prices and the expected level of future price appreciation.    
  Some researchers such as Smith and Smith (2006) have made truly heroic efforts 
to ensure their rental and owner-occupied properties are comparable, but this is not 
feasible for large scale statistical work that involves all the key markets in the country.  
Furthermore, given the large observable differences between rented and owned units, we 
suspect that unobservable differences are also considerable.  Moreover, even these units 
are not truly comparable because the demand for owned units comes from a different 
section of the population than the demand for rental units.  For example, owner-occupiers 
are substantially more likely to be richer, married and have minor children in the home.  
Data from the most recent AHS also shows that the median income of owner households 
is twice that of renter households.  Other sources indicate that income volatility is much 
greater for owners in general and for recent home buyers in particular.  All this suggests 
that there are related, but not precisely comparable, demand schedules for owning and 
renting, which further implies that rents and prices need not be all that highly correlated 
over time.   
  Section VI turns to the problems that make it difficult to use the short term, no 
arbitrage relationship implied by the ability to delay purchase or sale.  While there may 
not be many people on the margin between being a lifelong renter versus a lifelong 
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home purchase simply by remaining a renter or delaying a transition to rental status by 
not selling immediately.   
However, the ability to arbitrage by delaying the transition from rental to owning 
status in a declining market is limited by risk aversion and the high volatility of housing 
prices.  While it well may be reasonable to assume a household is risk neutral with 
respect to any single stock, the same is not true for housing because it is the dominant 
asset for most households.  If a buyer knows that she will have to buy, delaying the 
purchase creates a large amount of volatility in wealth because house prices vary so much 
even over annual periods.  Our calibrations show that reasonable amounts of risk aversion 
will lead one not to delay a purchase, especially in the more expensive and volatile 
coastal markets.   
However, risk aversion does not counterbalance the gains from delaying a sale 
when transitioning to rental status, largely because existing owners are likely to have 
much greater wealth.  While homeowners looking to sell and then rent are a group that 
could arbitrage on the rent-own margin, less than four percent of owners actually ever 
transition to renting (Sinai, 1997).  The small and select group of people who do so  
severely limits the influence of this arbitrage channel to equalize the returns to owning 
and renting.  Thus, it is quite possible that substantial random shocks to housing prices 
will not be arbitraged away by changing the timing of a purchase or sale. 
All this leads us to conclude that the relevant indifference relationships between 
owning and renting are not as tight as a purely financial perspective might indicate.  We 
do not doubt that there is a clear theoretical indifference relationship between the two 
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is very unlikely to be able to convincingly conclude that the price of housing is too high 
or too low relative to the cost of renting.  Of course, this does not mean that the financial 
approach provides no valuable insights and should be abandoned.   The equilibrium price 
of a durable asset like housing will always depend, at least partially, on financial 
variables such as the interest rate.  
Rather, our skepticism about the empirical precision of the own versus rent no 
arbitrage condition and the no excess returns no arbitrage condition leads us towards an 
approach which combines the spatial no arbitrage condition with aspects of the asset 
market perspective.   This still does not yield precise implications about price levels, but 
it does generate implications about the moments of housing price changes and new 
construction.   
In Section VII, we describe the results of Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) in which 
we use the spatial no arbitrage condition in combination with a no excess profits 
condition for builders to understand housing dynamics.  Those results strongly support 
the finding of Case and Shiller (1989) that there is too much high frequency positive 
serial correlation in price changes.  And, just as Shiller (1981) finds too much variation in 
stock prices relative to dividends, we find that there is too much volatility in price 
changes relative to changes in fundamentals in the expensive coastal markets.   Finally, 
we describe how to make more use of rental data in these exercises.  Section VIII 
concludes.   
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The spatial equilibrium model requires homeowners (or renters) to be indifferent 
between different locations.   If housing consumption is fixed, then we can write the 
utility function as    where   represents income,   is the cost of housing 
and   represents a vector of j location-specific amenities.  The term   represents 
cash after housing costs, and we are assuming that non-housing prices are constant across 
space.  The spatial equilibrium assumption implies that 
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where    denote the different elements in the vector of amenities.  Differences in 
housing prices across space are associated either with higher income levels or higher 
amenity levels.  The spatial equilibrium assumption allows us to treat one area within the 
U.S. as a reservation locale, and we denote its income as 
j i A ,
Y , its housing prices with R, 
and its amenity levels with  j A  for each amenity j.   We then use a first-order Taylor 
approximation to find that:  
(2)  ∑ = ∂
∂ − + − + ≈
J
j j i j A
U
U i i A Y Y R R 1 , 1
1 ( ) ( j A ) . 
In each location, the housing cost is approximately equal to the housing cost in the 
reservation locale plus the difference in income between location i and the reservation 
locale plus the sum of all of the amenity differences times the marginal utility of each 
amenity divided by the marginal utility from income.   
  8While this equation implies a tight, even one-for-one, relationship between the 
changes in the flow of housing costs and housing prices, it does not directly tell us about 
the level of prices at any given point in time.  It might be possible to use this to look at 
rent differences over space, but for reasons that we will discuss later, we think that 
renters and rental units are sufficiently unrepresentative of a metropolitan area that we are 
skeptical about using rents in this fashion.  If we want to use this equation to deal with 
prices, we need to make further assumptions that relate housing prices with per period 
housing costs.   
Following Poterba (1984) and others, the per period cost of housing can be 
written  )] ( ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) )( 1 ( t H t H t H p r − + − + −τ , where H(t) denotes housing prices at time 
t,   denotes the income tax rate, r denotes the interest rate and p denotes the local 
property tax rate. If we make the heroic assumption that we are in a steady state where 
housing prices are expected to be constant over time, then the per period housing costs 
are just   ) ( ) )( 1 ( t H p r + −τ , or  ) (t H μ , where μ  denotes a fixed ratio between housing 
prices and housing costs or  ) )( 1 ( p r − + τ .  If housing prices were known to appreciate at 
a fixed rate  a then the value of μ is (1-τ)(r+p) – α.   
If we know the value of μ, then the model makes a hard quantitative prediction 
about the relationship between changes in income and house prices.  Specifically, every 
dollar increase in income should be associated with a  μ
1  increase in housing costs.   The 
relationship between housing costs and incomes across metropolitan areas in 2000 is 
shown in Figure 1.  While the slope is undeniably positive, the coefficient is 5.6 (standard 
error of 0.99), meaning that a $1 increase in income is associated with a $5.60 increase in 
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1  This would be compatible with the model if μ was equal to 0.18.  
However, this number is higher than standard user cost estimates which range from 7.5-
12 percent.  Such user costs would suggest that the coefficient on income should lie 
between 8 and 12, yet we generally find that it is far lower.
2   
We can still save the spatial equilibrium model by appealing to omitted variables.  
For example, higher income places might also have lower amenity values, especially if 
the higher income levels are compensating for lower amenities as in Rosen (1979).  
Alternatively, higher prices might not accurately reflect different housing costs because 
we are ignoring any heterogeneity in expected housing cost appreciation.   Thus, the 
spatial equilibrium model is salvageable, but any claims about its tight precision are not.  
The one numerically precise implication that comes out of the model doesn’t seem to fit 
the data, and if the model is correct, then unobserved variables must be quite important.   
In addition, predictions about prices and amenities are never particularly tight.  
Certainly, the model predicts that prices should rise with positive amenities, as indeed 
they do.  Figure 2 shows the positive connection between housing prices and median 
January temperature across the same sample of metropolitan areas in 1990.  However, 






1 that would enable us to know whether 
the observed relation of a $1,158 higher house price (standard error of $549) for each 
extra degree of winter warmth is too high or too low.  Indeed, housing price regressions 
of this kind are generally used to provide such estimates since nothing else is available.   
                                                 
1 The underlying data are from our 2006 working paper which uses information on 116 metropolitan areas 
for which we have consistent price and income data over more than two decades.  The house price data are 
for the median quality home from the 1980 census, with the house value in 2000 reflecting the appreciation 
in the OFHEO repeat sales index for each metropolitan area.  Median family income is from the 2000 
decennial census.  All values are in $2000.   
2 Different cross sections and data generate different results, of course.  If we use 1990 data, the coefficient 
estimate increases to 6.2, but that still implies higher user costs than most researchers believe are sensible. 
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relationship, we also gain predictions about the dynamics of housing prices:  
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This equation implies that changes in housing costs should be tightly connected to 
changes in income and changes in amenities.  However, it does not directly tell us about 
the level of prices either.  Moreover, assuming that we are in a steady state where housing 
prices are fixed is logically inconsistent with a regression that is examining heterogeneity 
in housing price changes.  If we want to use this equation to deal with prices, we need to 
make further assumptions that relate housing prices with per period housing costs.  In 
particular, we need to make assumptions about the extent to which housing price changes 
are expected or unexpected.   
At one extreme, we can assume that any shocks to income or amenities are 
completely unexpected.  In that case, the model predicts that a $1 increase in income will 
continue to be associated with a  μ
1 dollar increase in housing prices.  This assumption is 
surely counterfactual since local income changes are quite predictable (Glaeser and 
Gyourko, 2006).  
The other extreme is to assume that local income changes are entirely known in 
advance.  To create simple closed form solutions, we can go so far as to assume amenities 
and housing costs in the reservation locale are constant over time and that the gap in 
income between location i and the reservation locale is growing by   dollars per 
period.   In this case,  
Y i g ,
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+  .   Expected income changes will 
have exactly the same impact on housing price changes as unexpected income changes, 
as long as those income changes are part of a long-run trend in income appreciation.   
  An intermediate option that yields a slightly different result is to assume that there 
is a one-time increase in income between time t and t+1 that is anticipated, but that there 
will not be any more shocks to income after that point.  In that case, the impact of 
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Price changes will exist, and they will be predictable, but they will be much smaller than 
in the case where price changes are unexpected or where they reflect a long-run trend.   
Since we know little about the information that people have about income shocks, the 
model does not deliver a tight relationship between housing price changes and income 
changes.   Instead, the implied coefficient could range from  μ
1 , which could be more than 
ten, to  μ     1
1
+ , which is less than one.    
  Figure 3 plots the actual relationship between house price changes and income 
changes across metropolitan areas between 1980 and 2000 for the same 116 metropolitan 
area sample used above.  House prices again use the 1980 Census median value as the 
base value, with the relevant OFHEO metropolitan area price index used to scale prices 
over time.  The change in income is the 20 year difference in median family income 
between the 1980 and 2000 censuses.  As expected, the figure shows a robust positive 
  12relationship, with a coefficient of 5.1 (standard error of 0.42) from a simple regression of 
20-year price changes on 20-year income changes.  Happily, this number lies between 1 
and 10, so it does not reject the spatial equilibrium model.  However, the bounds implied 
by the model are so loose that it would have been shocking for the model to be rejected.   
  In sum, we have shown that the spatial no arbitrage condition fails to yield tight 
predictions about the relationship between housing prices and income, which we treat as 
the “fundamental” in that model.  This weakness surely plays a role in explaining why 
real estate economists have been attracted to other no arbitrage relations, which we 
consider next. 
 
III.  The Arbitrage of Buying and Renting   
Case and Shiller’s (1989) pioneering work on housing price dynamics discusses 
both the no arbitrage conditions for buyers and for investors.  The no arbitrage condition 
for buyers is usually a no arbitrage condition between buying and renting, which may 
either involve a lifetime indifference or an indifference between buying (or selling) and 
renting for a short time period.  Case and Shiller (1989) themselves emphasize the 
decision of a buyer to purchase today or to wait for a year.   Those authors also discuss 
the possible decision of a buyer who is looking at whether or not to increase housing 
consumption.  In this case, estimating the costs of delay must include an estimate of the 
inconvenience associated with consuming too little housing.   Since that inconvenience 
level surely is impossible to directly measure, this approach cannot offer much precision, 
and we are not surprised that subsequent work has focused primarily on the owner-renter 
  13no arbitrage condition.  We will first focus on that condition, and then turn to the 
investor’s no arbitrage condition.   
The simplest version of the financial approach to housing involves a one-period 
indifference condition where consumers receive the same return from owning or renting 
the identical housing unit.  We will later emphasize that risk aversion is likely to be far 
more important in the context of housing markets than it is in financial assets, but we 
begin with a representative risk neutral individual who is considering buying a house at 
time t and leaving the city with probability one at time t+1.  The buyer must pay property 
taxes of p times the housing price H.  The interest rate at which this person can both 
borrow and lend is given by r.  Both property taxes and interest payments are deductible 
for owner-occupiers.  If we further assume this person earns Y(t) dollars and faces a 
marginal tax rate of τ, then the owner’s user cost of housing will equal (1-τ)(r+p)H(t) – 
[H(t+1) – H(t)].  If the same individual rents, housing costs equal R(t). 
  Poterba (1984) and others have emphasized additional costs of housing, too.  For 
example, the average owner spends nearly $2,100 per year on maintenance, although 
there is substantial measurement error in this variable (Gyourko and Tracy, 2006).  In 
addition, this observable component of maintenance misses the time and effort that 
owner-occupiers put into caring for their homes.  The economic depreciation of a house 
is also difficult to measure.  Of course, ownership may also bring with it hidden benefits 
such as the ability to customize the housing unit to one’s own needs.  We let δH(t) denote 
the net unobserved costs of being an owner-occupier, or one’s own landlord as it were.  
  With these costs, indifference between owning and renting for a risk-neutral 
resident implies that R(t) = [(1-τ)(r+p) + δ]H(t) – E[H(t+1) – H(t)], where the final term 
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and imposing a transversality condition on housing prices yields the familiar formula that 
prices are the appropriately discounted sum of rents:  ∑
∞
=












.   
  As this equation shows, it is impossible to determine the appropriate price of 
housing as a function of rents without knowing the long term path of rents.  Since 
expected future rents are certainly unobservable, this in turn creates ambiguity in the 
formula.  One approach is to assume that rents will rise at a constant rate a, so 
that  .  If so, then equation (5) holds   ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t R a j t R
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Equation (5) is also implied by a one period no arbitrage relationship if housing prices are 
expected to increase at a rate of ‘a’ over the next period (i.e., E[H(t+1)] =(1+a) H(t)).  
Thus, this formula does not require individuals to be indifferent between owning and 
renting over their lifetimes or that rents will continue to rise at a fixed rate forever.      
This ratio can then be used to predict housing values if rents, true maintenance 
and depreciation, interest rates, property tax rates, marginal income tax rates, and 
expected capital gains are known, and if unobserved influences on user costs are small in 
magnitude.
3  Drawing on Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) for some baseline 
numbers, if τ=0.25, r=0.055, p=0.015, δ=0.025, and α=0.038, the nominal price-to-rent 
ratio is 25.
4   
                                                 
3 It is noteworthy that Poterba (1984), who generally is credited with introducing this model into 
mainstream economics, neither considered the own-rent margin nor equated the utility flow from owning 
with the observed rental price of a house.  He used the user cost formula to determine the cost to owners, 
which then shifts the demand for the quantity of housing. 
4 This is only slightly higher than the ratio predicted by the more complex formula used by those authors. 
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there is a reasonable amount of uncertainty about what true maintenance, expected 
appreciation, and even what the relevant interest and tax rates are.  For example, if 
expected appreciation actually is one percentage point higher, the multiple increases by 
about one-third to 34, and larger changes can be generated by incorporating relatively 
minor adjustments to the other parameters.  While a one percentage point increase in 
permanent rent appreciation may be a big number, a one percentage point increased in 
expected price appreciation over a one year period represents a much more modest 
change.  Thus, any reasonable sensitivity analysis is going to result in a fairly wide bound 
for what prices ‘should be’ in a given market.
5    This wide bound means that it will be 
very difficult to convincingly evaluate whether prices seem rational or not based purely 
on the financial no arbitrage condition.   
  
                                                 
5 We have greater faith in the value of the comparative statics suggested by equation (5) than in its ability to 
justify the level of prices.  However, there is considerable debate in the literature over one important result 
involving the impact of interest rates on house prices.  Equation (5) suggests a powerful relationship 
between interest rates and house prices, and McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai 
(2005) have relied on it to justify currently high house prices at least partially as a function of historically 
low interest rates.  In contrast, Shiller (2005, 2006) argues that there is no economically or statistically 
significant relationship between house prices and interest rates over any reasonably long period of time.  
When we regressed the real value of the median quality home from 1980 (using the OFHEO index as 
described above) on the real 7-year interest rate using data from the last 30 years, the results indicated that 
a one percentage point increase in interest rates is associated with only a 2-3 percent rise in house prices.  
The R
2=0.12, which is well below the nearly 2/3rds of variation in house prices that can be accounted for 
by metropolitan area fixed effects.  However, this is a very complex issue that cannot be definitively 
answered within the confines of such a simple static model.  For example, one can imagine a dynamic 
setting in which interest rates mean revert and in which homeowners either can refinance loans or expect to 
sell and buy another home within a few years.  In that context, temporary rises in rates need not lead to 
substantially higher debt service costs (in present value terms) that are capitalized into lower house values 
if refinancing costs are low and borrowers believer rates will drop in the relatively near future.  Of course, 
borrowers will not want to refinance mortgages obtained during periods of abnormally low rates.  Still, the 
extent to which temporary drops in interest rates are capitalized into high houses will be mitigated by the 
expected length of tenure on the margin.  In general, mean reversion in interest rates implies that we should 
see far less connection between current rates and house prices than is predicted by the constant interest rate 
version of the model (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2006).  In addition, we would expect interest rates to have 
relatively little impact on house prices in elastically supplied markets where prices tend to be pinned down 
by construction costs, which themselves are determined primarily by labor and materials costs, not capital 
costs (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005);  Glaeser and Gyourko (2006)). 
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One underappreciated problem with using the rent-own no arbitrage condition to 
make inferences about housing prices is that rental units are generally quite different 
from owner-occupied housing and that renters and owners are very different people.  
These stylized facts, which are documented just below, are important because 
mismeasurement of unit quality makes it hard to compare rents and home prices, and the 
fact that the demand for these types of these units comes from different types of people 
likely matters for expectations about future housing prices.    
We begin by documenting a number of physical characteristics of owner-occupied 
and rental units in Table 1.  For this analysis, we rely primarily on the latest American 
Housing Survey (AHS) from the year 2005.  Perhaps the most striking fact about renting 
and owning is the very strong correlation between unit type and physical structure.  The 
2005 AHS shows that 64.3 percent of owner-occupied housing units were of the single-
family, detached unit type, while only 17.7 percent of rental units were of that type.  The 
vast majority of rental units are in multiple-unit buildings, not single-unit, detached 
dwellings.   
Naturally, these types of units are of very different sizes.  Figure 4, which is taken 
from Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), plots the median square footage of owned versus 
rented units using data from the last twenty years of the AHS.  The median owner-
occupied unit is nearly double the size of the median rented housing unit in the United 
States.  Per person consumption of space also varies widely by tenure status.  Housing 
consumption per capita among owner-occupied households is now over 700 square feet, 
while that for renters is about 450 square feet (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2007). 
  17Not only is the owner-occupied versus rental stock physically quite different, the 
two types of housing tend to be located in different parts of the metropolitan area, as well 
as in different quality neighborhoods.  The suburban dominance of owner-occupancy is 
highlighted in the second row of Table 1.  Less than one-third of all owned units were in 
the central cities of metropolitan areas according to the 2005 AHS.  Ownership has 
become more widespread in America’s central cities, but nearly half of all rental units 
still are located in cities (row 2, column 2 of Table 1).  Owner-occupied units tend to be 
in better neighborhoods, too.  The AHS asks its survey responders to rate their 
neighborhoods on a scale of 1-10.  Just looking at those who gave their neighborhoods 
very high scores of 9 or 10 score shows that almost one-half of owners believe they live 
in the highest quality areas, while only one-third of renters felt the same way (row 3, 
Table 1). 
Just as owned units are different from rented units, owner-occupiers are quite 
different from renters. Perhaps most importantly, owners are substantially richer.  The 
median nominal income of owner-occupier households was $53,953 versus $24,651 for 
renter households according to the 2005 AHS (row 4, Table 1).  Household types also 
tend to differ systematically by tenure status, as indicated by the fact that the probability 
an owner-occupier household is a married couple with minor children present is nearly 
double that of a renter household (bottom row of Table 1).    
There are at least two reasons why the characteristics of owners should influence 
the price-to-rent ratio.  First, since owner-occupied housing tends to be surrounded by 
other owner-occupied housing and since the characteristics of neighbors is likely to be an 
important influence on price, occupant characteristics themselves should be thought of as 
  18an often unobserved factor influencing both home prices and rents.  Second, since the 
price of owner-occupied housing depends on what you can sell that housing for next 
period, the characteristics of owner-occupiers will impact current price because they will 
impact the state of demand in future periods.  
For example, the higher volatility of incomes among owner-occupiers will surely 
impact expectations about future demand for owner-occupied housing.  Comparing the 
incomes over time of recent buyers in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
with that for the mean in an area as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) finds 
the volatility of recent buyer income roughly double that of the average income in the 
same market (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2006).  A similar pattern can be seen specifically for 
the New York City market in the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) 
data.  A simple regression of the income of recent buyers (defined as those who bought 
within the past two years) on BEA-reported per capita real income for that market finds 
that recent buyer income goes up by $1.29 for every $1.00 increase in BEA-measured 
income.  Moreover, the same source reveals that renter-household incomes are less 
volatile than average.  They increase by only $0.47 for every $1.00 rise in per capita 
income in the city.
6
                                                 
6 Because the NYCHVS provides much smaller samples, the regression results are based on averages of 
individual respondents over two-year windows.  Effectively, there are only nine observations after 
averaging, and while the regression coefficients are statistically significant, one clearly does not want to 
make too much of this.  The underlying regression results are as follows.  For owners,  
 
Recent Buyer Real Income=-32,451+  1.29*BEA Per Capita Real Income. 
                                             (15,102)   (0.19)  
 
There are nine observations (one for each survey year), the R
2=0.87, and standard errors are in parentheses.  
For renters, 
 
     Renter Real Income=  -2,885 + 0.47*BEA Per Capita Real Income. 
                                                (5,436)  (0.07) 
 
  19Taken literally, all this indicates that the variance of income shocks for renters is 
only a small fraction of that for owners or for the general population.  If so, rent series 
should be more stable than house prices.  On the aggregate level, Leamer (2002) has 
emphasized that house prices have grown much more quickly than rents.  In the 44 
markets for which we have both consistent rent data from a prominent industry consultant 
and constant quality repeat sales indices, Table 2 documents that the annual appreciation 
rate for housing is 1.9 percent since 1980, while that for rents is only 0.5 percent.
7  Table 
2 also reports results for a handful of representative major markets in which price growth 
typically is at least double that of rent growth.  Similar patterns with relatively low rent 
volatility also exist if one breaks the data into different time periods. 
One explanation for the mismatch in the growth of housing prices and rents is that 
housing prices represent the cost of accessing higher quality housing units, while rental 
prices represent the cost of accessing lower quality units.  Rising incomes and rising 
income inequality could easily mean that demand has increased more for higher quality 
units.  Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2005) argue that housing prices have risen more 
steadily for metropolitan areas with higher amenity levels.   
Of course, an empirical mismatch between house price growth and rent growth 
still could be explained by a purely financial model if other factors such as interest rates 
or expected house price appreciation themselves are changing.  We have already noted 
                                                                                                                                                 
The number of observations again is nine, the R
2 still is 0.87, and standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
7 The rental series is from REIS, Inc.  The company does not report a constant quality series, but their data 
are consistently measured in the sense they reflect the answers to a question about asking rents on higher 
quality apartment complexes in major U.S. markets.  Rent data are very rare and there is little existing 
analysis of the robustness of such series.  We found that the REIS asking rent series is strongly positively 
correlated with the rent subindex of the local CPI index that the Commerce Department computes for about 
25 areas nationwide.  REIS also reports an ‘effective rent’ series that allegedly reflects discounts or 
premiums being charged tenants.  That series is not positively, and sometimes is negatively, correlated with 
the local CPI rent subindex numbers.  Hence, we do not use it in any of the analysis reported here. 
  20the debate about the role of interest rates, so that remains an unsettled issue.  There also is 
not much convincing evidence that the differences between home prices and rents are 
positively correlated with price appreciation.  A proper user cost model implies that the 
user costs of housing minus rents should equal expected house price appreciation.   
In Table 3, we report the results from regressing actual house price appreciation 
on the gap between user costs and rents, using the user cost data from Himmelberg, 
Mayer and Sinai (2005).
8  Over one, three and five year horizons, there is a negative, not 
a positive, relationship between actual house price appreciation and the change in house 
prices forecast by a user cost model.  While Shiller-type animal spirits certainly could be 
behind this, our point simply is that there is no strong evidence that variation in the 
relationship between prices and rents is systematically related to accurate assessments of 
house price appreciation. 
This leads us to conclude that the house price and rent series can be understood as  
the costs of two different types of housing.  The differences seem so large that it probably 
is best to think of them as reflecting different demands for two related, but not directly 
comparable, markets.  Of course, there still will be some sort of indifference relationship 
between owned and rental housing, but quantifying this relationship in the way suggested 
by the standard user cost approach will overstate the empirical precision of the approach.  
Essentially, the indifference relationship appears to be sufficiently weak that there is 
                                                 
8 We thank Todd Sinai for providing their underlying data.  Because we need user costs before expected 
housing appreciation, we added back their appreciation component, which is based on the long-run average 
annual real appreciation rate over 1940-2000 in Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2005).  We then create a 
shorter-run expected price change variable by multiplying the user costs before appreciation figure by the 
real value of a 1980 quality home and then subtracting  real asking rents.  The house price variable is 
computed by scaling the mean house value in each market as reported in the 1980 census by the OFHEO 
repeat sales index appreciation for each year.  The rent data are from REIS, Inc, and are discussed above.     
  21abundant opportunity for the measured financial costs of owning to diverge significantly 
from those of renting.     
 
V.  The Importance of Omitted Costs 
Smith and Smith (2006) represent the best effort that has been made to deal with 
the often stark differences in rental versus owner-occupied units.  However, their 
approach still faces the problem that owners and renters are likely to be quite different 
people.  Moreover, this work also needs to deal with the challenge that unobserved 
factors in equation (5) such as maintenance costs may be very important and could lead 
to quite different predictions about the appropriate relationship between housing prices 
and rents. 
Both theory and data suggest that unobserved influences on user costs are likely 
to be large in magnitude.  A rental property must involve two different agents—the renter 
and the landlord—and both of them have relevant no arbitrage conditions.  The renter 
must be indifferent between renting and owning.  The landlord must be indifferent 
between owning a housing unit and renting it out and investing one’s capital in something 
else.  This no arbitrage condition implies a second way of evaluating the appropriate 
price of housing, but the price implied by the investor’s no arbitrage condition will be 
very different from the price implied by the renter’s no arbitrage condition, unless 
omitted variables are quite important.   
To illustrate this, we assume that the investor also has the ability to borrow at 
interest rate r.  The relevant no arbitrage condition is that the net present value of 
revenues from the property is zero.  Gross revenues equal the rent received each period, 
  22or R(t).  Property taxes on the unit are the same as for an owner-occupier.  However, we 
allow for net maintenance costs to differ, so that they equal δIH(t) for the investor.  
Profits are taxed, but the tax rate is irrelevant if there are zero profits.  Hence, the zero 
profit condition is given by equation (6), 
 
(6) R(t) + E[H(t+1) – H(t)] – (r + p + δI)H(t) = 0. 
 
 
The same zero profit condition holds if the investor either can lend money at rate  
r or buy a house, with all revenues being taxed at a rate τI.  The relevant indifference 
condition is given by (1-τI)rH(t) = (1-τI)[R(t) – (p + δI)H(t) – E{H(t+1)-H(t)}] , which 
again yields equation (6).  Thus, the tax rate on the investor does not impact the 
relationship between prices and rents in this simple model.   
  Iterating equation (6) and imposing a transversality condition implies that 
∑
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There are two ways to use equations (5) and (5’).   First, we can assume that δ=δI 
and ask how much bigger the price-to-(net) rent ratio should be for owner-occupiers than 
for landlords.  For owner-occupiers, the no arbitrage condition predicts a price-to-net rent 
ratio of 
a p r − + + − δ τ ) )( 1 (
1
.  For the investor-landlord, the price-to-net rent 
relationship predicted by the no arbitrage condition is 
a p r − + + δ
1
.  The two 
relationships are the same only when the owner-occupier does not deduct interest and 
taxes.     
  23However, the housing literature that uses the rent-own no arbitrage decision to 
deduce housing prices generally assumes that owners are deducting interest.
9  Recall 
from above that using Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai’s (2005) assumptions for our 
parameter values finds the price-to-rent ratio given by  
a p r − + + − δ τ ) )( 1 (
1
 is about 25 
(~1/.0395).   However, the investor-landlord’s no arbitrage condition implies a price-rent 
ratio of 
a p r − + + δ
1
, which equals 17.5.  This means that owner-occupiers should be 
willing to pay about 45 percent more for the same house than should a landlord (25/17.5 
~1.45).   
One way of interpreting this is that if we think that price-to-rent ratio eliminates 
arbitrage between renting and owning, then housing is nearly 50 percent too expensive to 
eliminate the arbitrage between being a landlord and other forms of investment.  This gap 
increases in higher appreciation or inflation environments because the tax subsidy to 
owner occupiers rises with inflation (Poterba, 1984).  If expected inflation increases so 
that the nominal interest rate rises to 8 percent and the rate of appreciation equals .063 
instead of .038, then the ratio 
a p r − + + − δ τ ) )( 1 (
1
 rises to over 30, while the ratio 
a p r − + + δ
1
 remains at 17.5.  Indeed, it is relatively easy to envision environments in 
                                                 
9 Data on itemization by tenure status is not directly reported by the IRS, but it is only natural to presume 
that homeowners are more likely to itemize.  Nationally, only 35.7 percent of all tax returns filed in 2005 
did so.  Given the nearly 69 percent homeownership rate estimated for that year, at least half of owners did 
not itemize, even if we assume that all itemizers own their home.  However, itemization rates are higher in 
higher house price areas, which is consistent with more owners in those markets being able to deduct local 
property taxes and mortgage interest payments.  For example, 39.9 percent of California returns, 38.8 
percent of New York returns, and 45.2 percent of New Jersey returns itemized in 2005. 
  24which the price-to-rent ratio implied by the owner-occupier’s no arbitrage condition 
literally would be double that implied by the investor’s no arbitrage condition.  
  There are many possible ways that we can reconcile these seemingly incompatible 
predictions about price-to-rent ratios.  We wrote the model so that different 
maintenance/depreciation rates could do the job.  The two no arbitrage conditions will 
imply the same price-to-rent ratio when τ(r+p) = δ – δI, or when the difference in the 
maintenance rates just equals the difference in the tax advantage provided owner 
occupiers.  If τ=0.25, and r+p=0.07, then this would mean that the maintenance costs are 
0.0175 higher for the owner-occupier than for the landlord.  Only if it costs more for the 
owner to keep up his home can we explain why landlords would ever buy and rent at the 
same prices that make owner-occupiers indifferent between owning and renting. 
  A second way to reconcile the two no arbitrage conditions is that the landlord’s 
cost of capital might be lower than the owner-occupier’s cost of capital.  Perhaps the 
marginal buyer has more difficulty making a down payment or negotiating the loan 
process.  If maintenance costs were the same, then landlords would need to face interest 
rate costs that were 175 basis points lower than prospective tenants in our simple 
example.   
  Alternatively, risk tolerance might differ between owners and landlords.  Perhaps 
the marginal buyer has a relatively short time horizon in the city and does not want to 
face the risk of housing price shocks (Sinai and Souleles, 2005), while landlords are 
diversified and remain immune to those shocks.  There are many unobserved factors that 
could explain the seeming incompatibility of the two no arbitrage conditions.   
  25Our point is that unobservable elements must be quite important in housing 
markets because they need to explain a 40+ percent difference in the price-to-rent ratios 
predicted by the landlord’s no arbitrage condition and the owner-occupier’s no arbitrage 
condition.  The magnitude of these unobserved factors makes us wary of believing these 
conditions can be used to definitively answer whether prices are too high or too low. 
 
VI.  Risk Aversion and the One Period No Arbitrage Condition 
We now turn to the impact of risk-aversion on the one-period no arbitrage 
condition between owning and renting.  While owners and renters are generally quite 
different people, individuals are often both renters and owners over the course of their 
lifetimes.  When they transition from renting to owning, or the reverse, individuals have 
the opportunity to delay purchase, or sale, to exploit predictability in housing prices.  
Case and Shiller (1989) specifically focus on the ability to exploit excess returns by 
delaying consumption for one period.   
In this section, we argue that the ability to exploit any predictable excess returns 
is compromised by the interaction between risk aversion and the volatility of housing 
prices.  While individuals may be effectively risk neutral with respect to one individual 
stock that represents a small share of their overall portfolio, housing usually is the 
dominant asset for most homeowners.  Normal year-to-year variation in housing prices 
can create significant swings in an individual’s total wealth.  The magnitude of these 
swings creates an incentive for anyone who knows that they are going to buy next year to 
buy today and for anyone who knows that they are going to sell next year to sell today.  
  26Thus, there appear to be even more limits to arbitrage in the housing market than there 
are in the financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
Consider the case of a household that knows with certainty that it eventually will 
own a home in a given market, and assume that it can either buy at time t or wait until 
time t+1.  To simplify the notation from above, we abstract from local property taxes and 
assume away any unobserved costs associated with maintenance or other aspects of 
owning.  The only two flow costs remaining are debt service, where the interest rate still 
is denoted r, and known maintenance and depreciation, which is denoted as M. 
We assume that this household is maximizing its expected wealth, 
denoted , where   refers to wealth net of housing costs as of time 
t+1.  By assumption, the household must have bought a home by that date.  If the 
household buys at time t, its wealth at time t+1 is predictable.  The household’s total 
welfare will equal 
( () 1 + t Wealth V E )
)
1 + t Wealth
( ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 ( t M t H Y r V − − − + τ .  If it rents at time t and then buys, 
its wealth at time t+1 will be stochastic and will equal 
() () ) 1 ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 ( + − − − + t H t R Y r V E τ .   
To calibrate the model, we will use a second-order Taylor series expansion for the 
function V(.) and assume that  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( t t H t H t H t H ε + − + + = + , where  ) (t ε  is 
mean zero and  ) ( ) 1 ( t H t H − +  is the predictable component of the change in housing 
prices.  With these assumptions, delay only makes sense if: 
 
(7) () () ( ) ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 ( 2
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  27where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion, i.e. 
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σ , and z represents 
the ratio of expected one period gains from delaying to total wealth if the individual does 
not delay, i.e.  ()
() ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1
t M t H Y r
t M t R t H t H t rH
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.   
Equation (7) provides a useful bound for the plausible amount of expected losses 
that would justify waiting one year given reasonable values of risk aversion.  The 
standard deviation of annual housing price changes in our sample of 116 metropolitan 
areas is just over $9,100.  If the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2 and if we assume 
non-home wealth of $50,000 for a person buying at time t, then the expected gains from 
waiting would need to be at least $1,750.
10  Thus, risk aversion causes the plausible gulf 
between the user costs of owning and rental housing costs to increase by nearly $150 per 
month, even for a renter household with $50,000 in non-housing wealth. 
To help gauge whether the potential benefit of exploiting short-run predictability 
can counter this risk aversion affect, we begin by regressing the one-year, forward-
looking change in house prices on observables such as the current house price and 
macroeconomic variables such as the long-term real rate and real gross domestic product.  
We also include metropolitan area dummies, so knowledge of average, one-year price 
changes also is presumed.  All the observables are statistically significant predictors of 
the coming year’s price change.  Table 4 reports the distribution of predicted one-year 
                                                 
10 To simply the calculation, this result also assumes that (1-τ)rH(t) + M(t) – R(t) = 0, not only that non-
housing wealth or ((1+(1-τ)r)(Y – H(t)) – M(t)) = $50,000.  
  28changes.
11  Just under one-third of the expected one-year changes in house prices are 
negative (31 percent to be precise), and only 18 percent of the cases involve expected 
losses of more than -$1,750, which is required to generate positive returns to a renter 
household delaying purchase for one year, given our assumptions. 
This calculation, however, assumes that the variation in housing prices is constant 
across markets, which obviously is not the case.  Hence, in the second column of the 
table, we report the distribution of the total gains from delay for our hypothetical 
household using information on price volatility at the metropolitan area level.  Predicted 
price changes still are estimated via the specification with metropolitan area fixed effects, 
lagged house price, and the other economic variables.  However, the variance of ε is 
computed separately for each metropolitan area by using the relevant residuals from the 
equation used to predict housing price changes.  Once again assuming that 
() ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 t R t M t rH − + −τ equals zero, ( ) ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 ( t M t H Y r − − − + τ  equals $50,000 
and σ equals two, the formula for expected gains minus risk aversion-related losses then 
equals  
) ( ) 1 ( 2 000 , 100
) ( 2
) ( ) 1 (
t H t H
Var
t H t H
− + +
− − + −
ε
.  
The second column in Table 4 reports on the distribution of net benefits from our 
hypothetical renter household delaying purchase of a home for a year.  They are positive 
in only 26 percent of the cases, and a look at the results by metropolitan areas indicates 
that it is in the high price volatility coastal markets where risk aversion almost always 
more than counterbalances the gross benefits of waiting to purchase in a declining 
market.  As indicated by the results in column one, house prices are expected to rise in 
                                                 
11 The precise equation estimated is Pi,t+1 – Pi,t = α + β*Pi,t + γ*10yrRealRatet + δ*RealGDPt + η*MSAi + 
εi,t.  All results are available upon request.  
  29most markets in most years.  However, even in the highest appreciation markets in the 
northeast region and coastal California, our naïve forecasting equation does generate 
expected declines in the early 1980s and the early 1990s when general economic 
conditions were quite poor.  Nevertheless, in no case does our simple calculation show a 
positive return to delaying purchase in any of the five major coastal California markets in 
our sample (Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, and Santa Barbara).  For 
the Boston and New York City areas, the return to delay is positive only once—in 1980 
when forecasted price declines were large enough to outweigh the costs associated with 
risk aversion.   
The reason is the very high volatilities of price changes in these markets.  The 
values of Var(ε) among these seven large coastal markets, range from a low of $175 
million in Boston to a high of $572 million in San Francisco.  In contrast, the impact of 
risk aversion is much less in many interior markets.  For example, Atlanta’s Var(ε) value 
is only $12.9 million.  Its home prices were expected to fall in only 8 of the 26 years for 
which we can forecast, but in each of those years the return to our hypothetical renter 
household delaying purchase for year is positive.   
In sum, this arbitrage opportunity only has value if price declines can be expected, 
and that is not the normal condition in our housing markets.  However, even if we 
reasonably can expect price declines over the coming year in markets such as New York, 
Boston, and the Bay Area, the volatility of their house price changes is more than enough 
so that risk aversion eliminates any gain from delaying the purchase of a home.  Hence, it 
seems unlikely that renters considering changing tenure status in these markets will find 
this potential arbitrage opportunity to be of value.  
  30Of course, there also is the possibility to arbitrage renting and owning among 
those individuals who are moving from owner-occupied to rental housing.  In this case, 
people could delay a year in order to take advantage of a rising market.  To consider this 
issue more formally, we continue to assume that households maximize  .  
If a household sells immediately, its expected wealth is deterministic and expected 
welfare will equal 
() () 1 + t Wealth V E
( ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 ( t R t H Y r V ) − + − + τ .  If the household waits a year, then 
its time t+1 wealth is stochastic and expected welfare will equal 
( ( )) ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( 1 ( t M t H Y r V E − + ) ) + − + τ .  Again using a second-order Taylor series 
expansion, we see that it is sensible to wait if and only if: 
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where σ continues to denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and   represents 
the ratio of expected one period gains from delaying to total wealth if the individual does 
not delay, i.e. 
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.   
The impact of risk aversion should be smaller here because wealth should be 
much larger.  To show this more clearly, we now calculate the distribution of gains from 
waiting a year to sell a home, again computing Var(ε) at the metropolitan area level.  As 
before, we assume that () ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 t R t M t rH − + −τ equals zero, and σ equals two, but now 
we presume that ( ) ( )) ( )( ) 1 ( 1 ( t M t H Y r ) − + − + τ  equals $250,000.  With these 
assumptions the expected risk-adjusted gain from waiting a year can be written as   
) ( ) 1 ( 2 000 , 500
) ( 2
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t H t H
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  31The third column of Table 4 reports our estimates of the distribution of expected 
gains from an existing owner delaying sale.  While it often did not make sense to delay a 
purchase decision to take advantage of falling prices, especially in the more volatile 
markets, there generally are substantial gains from delaying a sales decision to take 
advantage of rising prices.  Over 70 percent of the observations exhibit positive returns to 
this potential arbitrage opportunity.  Not only are prices expected to appreciate in most 
cases, but the much larger assumed wealth substantially mitigates the impact of risk 
aversion so that it rarely counterbalances the benefits of delay even in the most volatile 
markets.  In principle, the population of home-owners looking to sell and rent represents 
one group that really could arbitrage along the own-rent margin whenever prices are 
expected to increase.  
 However, there is a reason to expect that the impact of this arbitrage possibility 
on housing prices is quite small—namely, very few people actually transition from 
owning to renting.  Sinai (1997) documents that transitions from owner-occupancy to 
renter status are quite rare. Working with a 1970-1992 panel of observations from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he shows that less than four percent of owners ever 
engage in such a tenure transition, and of those that do, about one-third transition back to 
ownership within two years.
12  Hence, we are skeptical that this group can be a real force 
for creating an equilibrium where renting and owning returns are equalized. 
 
                                                 
12 Capital gains taxation rules explain the short tenure spells in this case.  A household must trade up in 
value within two years to be able to rollover any gains from the original sale.  Our point is not about the 
arcana of the tax code, but to illustrate that a large fraction of the transitions from owner-occupancy to 
rental status are very short term and probably not related to the arbitrage we are discussing.  In addition, 
Sinai (1997) reports that falls in income have an especially large impact on the probability of this type of 
tenure transition (see his Table 4), which suggests that households making this move are suffering some 
type of negative income shock, not trying to arbitrage along the rent-own margin.  
  32VII. Using Price and Rent Data Together to Understand Housing Markets 
While we have provided various reasons why it is problematic to use the buy-rent 
no arbitrage condition to produce precise predictions about housing prices, we still 
believe that there is much to be learned from the use of rents and prices together to 
understand housing dynamics.  In this section, we discuss three ways in which these data 
can be employed to add insight into housing prices.   
  The first use of rents lies in prediction without theory.  Rents may add predictive 
power to housing price change regressions even if we are not sure why they have this 
predictive power.  Table 5 details the results from nine regressions where changes in 
housing prices have been regressed on initial characteristics.  The basic specification is: 
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We repeat this specification for j equal to 1, 3, and 5 years, using the same house price 
variable described above.  As Case and Shiller (1989) first showed us, there is much that 
is predictable about house price changes simply from knowing previous price levels.    
  We then repeat this basic specification using the price-to-rent ratio instead of 
prices themselves, as in equation (9’):  
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Note that using the price-to-rent ratio is associated with uniformly higher t-statistics, as 
well as a higher R
2 for the 1- and 3-year price change horizons.  Over longer five year 
periods, one cannot reject the null that the elasticity of price changes with respect to the 
price-to-rent ratio is -1.  
  The final specification reported in Table 5 enters prices and rents separately, i.e.: 
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Note that both prices and rents are highly significant at standard confidence levels for 
high and low frequency price changes.  Higher levels of rents tend to predict higher price 
growth holding prices constant.  And, the R
2’s are uniformly higher than in the base case 
that includes only prices (row 1).   
  These regressions show that incorporating both prices and rents does improve our 
ability to explain housing price changes over time.  However, as our discussion above 
should have made clear, there are real problems in deciphering the meaning of these 
results.  A particularly naïve view might be that the negative correlation between the 








 equals one divided by ( )( ) a   -       p      r     -   1 δ τ + + .   If that were the case, then 
higher housing price-to-rent ratios should predict future appreciation, not future 
depreciation.  Clearly, they do not and especially not over longer time intervals. 
  One interpretation of these results is that the market is fundamentally irrational 
and that prices don’t internalize reasonable expectations of future housing price growth, 
but instead reflect some kind of irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2005).  An alternative 
interpretation is that rents are telling us about a related, but different, market than owner-
occupied housing.  Rents are, by and large, reflecting the cost of housing in lower quality 
homes in the inner city.  House values are, by and large, reflecting the cost of housing in 
the suburbs.  These lower quality inner city homes are not a perfect substitute for the 
suburban homes, but they are at least something of a substitute.  If higher rents are 
associated with higher housing price appreciation, this might reflect the fact that rents are 
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embedded in house prices.  Higher rents might well mean that demand is robust not only 
for high end housing, but for low end housing, and this could easily mean that the future 
of region is brighter. According to this view, the role of rents in the housing price 
regression does not reflect irrationality, but rather the natural role of providing more 
information about the future of the region’s economic strength.   
  While rents can naively be inserted into a regression aimed at maximizing 
predictive power, it is harder to actually connect housing prices and rents with a 
structural model to test its implications.  Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) write down a 
straightforward model of housing dynamics, and then test its implications using housing 
prices and permits, but we do not look significantly at rents for the reasons discussed 
below.  In the model, high frequency changes in demand for housing are driven by 
changing economic conditions within a region.  We use the model to generate predictions 
about the moments of price and quantity fluctuations.   
While Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) relies importantly on the spatial no arbitrage 
condition introduced by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), our framework, like any 
sensible model of changes in housing prices, is not finance free.  Interest rates certainly 
impact housing prices in a purely urban model, and their influence can differ across 
markets.  As Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) stress, lower interest rates should 
increase prices more in places with higher expected rental appreciation.  Our model 
produces a similar comparative static showing that the impact of expected local income 
growth on prices will be higher if interest rates are low.  Moreover, the impact of 
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and amenity levels.    
Our 2006 paper also highlights that unobservable differences in the information 
structure can have enormous impact on the predicted high frequency correlations between 
prices and new construction.  If people recognize economic changes only when they 
occur (i.e., they are true shocks), then the predicted correlation between contemporaneous 
price changes and new construction will be almost perfect.   However, if people can 
anticipate these changes a period before they occur, then the predicted correlation 
between price change and new construction will be almost zero.  As outside researchers 
have little ability to assess the actual information that people have, we believe that these 
results mean that it makes little sense to look at high frequency correlations between 
prices and construction.   
We believe it is problematic to focus on high frequency correlations between rents 
and housing prices for the same reason.  To reiterate, if people learn about economic 
changes only when they occur, then the correlation between price changes and rent 
changes will be extremely high;  if they learn about them a period or more ahead of time, 
then this correlation will be significantly lower.  In general, this makes us wary about 
how to properly interpret the correlations between price innovations and rents.   
However, the model does deliver important predictions that are more robust to 
changes in the information structure.  For example, the actual variances of price changes 
and new construction are implied by the variation in underlying economic shocks, and 
these relationships are not particularly sensitive to the timing of new information.  Our 
empirical work suggests that the variability of prices for the median market in the U.S. 
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for the most expensive models is far too high to be explained by the underlying economic 
variation.  This excess variation is the housing price analogue of Shiller’s (1981) finding 
of excess variation in the stock market.   
The model also predicts the autocorrelations of both price and quantity changes.  
Notably, despite the fact that the model has no irrationality, there is every reason to 
expect that price changes will be predictable.  In the long run, prices are predicted to 
mean revert both because economic shocks appear to mean revert and because new 
construction becomes available.  In fact, the model predicts a level of mean reversion 
over five years that is almost identical to the level of mean reversion that we see in the 
data.   
The model is less successful in predicting the high frequency positive serial 
correlation that is also a feature of the data.  The high frequency positive serial 
correlation in the OFHEO data is probably biased upwards because it contains appraisal 
data and because of inaccuracy in the timing of sales.  However, using much better sales 
data purged of these problems, Case and Shiller (1989) also documented substantial price 
persistence at high frequencies.   This serial correlation is not predicted by our spatial 
equilibrium model, and we agree with the original Case and Shiller conclusion that this 
momentum in high frequency price changes provides a challenge to conventional models 
of housing price dynamics.   
Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) do little with rents for two reasons.  There is good 
reason to believe that observed rent levels understate the true volatility of rents because 
of long-term relationships between some landlords and tenants.  This problem becomes 
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average incomes is informative about the marginal homebuyer, it cannot be so about the 
marginal renter.  As noted above, data from the New York City Housing and Vacancy 
Survey indicate that the variability of renter income is less than one-quarter of the 
variability of owner income.  This lower variability should predict low variation in rents.   
How then could rents be brought into a model of housing dynamics that started 
with a spatial no arbitrage assumption?  The first requirement is to have good high 
frequency income data for a set of metropolitan areas that reflected the income of 
potential renters.  For some larger metropolitan areas, this potentially could be done with 
the American Community Survey, but it would be difficult to get a significant sample of 
metropolitan areas.  The second requirement would be to obtain high frequency data on 
new rental contracts, preferably involving new tenants.  Such data presumably would be 
free of any implicit (or explicit) longer-term commitments between tenants and landlords.   
These tasks are not easy, but they offer some promise of enabling us to use rental data to 
test the predictions of the spatial no arbitrage model.  While we recognize the difficulties 
of these tasks, other approaches that rely more or less exclusively on a no arbitrage 
condition between owning and renting seem even less promising. 
 
VIII.  Summary and Conclusion 
Economics forms predictions about housing prices with no arbitrage conditions, 
and different researchers have emphasized different ways in which housing prices can be 
arbitraged.  The traditional urban approach has been to emphasize the absence of 
arbitrage across space, but this approach never delivers too much precision.  A more 
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ability of owners to arbitrage between owning and renting.   
  The major point of this paper is that the seeming empirical precision of these 
more financial approaches is illusory.  While the conceptual ability to arbitrage between 
owning and renting is clear, the ability to use this insight empirically is limited.  Owned 
units and rented units are extremely different.  Unobserved components of housing costs, 
like maintenance, are quite large.  Owners and renters are quite different people, and risk 
aversion creates a substantial cost to delaying a purchase especially.  For these reasons, 
we are skeptical that rental data can tell us much about the appropriate price of a house.  
Instead, we believe that integrating the financial no arbitrage condition into a 
spatial equilibrium model offers a more promising approach for understanding the nature 
of housing markets.  Our past work in this area suggests that some seeming anomalies of 
housing markets, like the high mean reversion of prices over five year intervals, is quite 
compatible with a rational spatial equilibrium model.  Other seeming anomalies, like high 
frequency positive serial correlation of price changes and high volatility in coastal 
markets, seem to be much harder to reconcile with such a market, just as Case and Shiller 
(1989) have suggested.  It would be possible to bring rents into such a model if we had 
better data on the income series of potential renters, and if we had better data on new 
rental contracts.  We hope future work will follow this path. 
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  41Table 1:  Comparing the Owner-Occupied and Rental Housing Stocks
a




%Single-Family Detached Unit Type  64.3  17.7 
%Located in Central Cities  30.5  45.7 




Median Household Income in 2005  $53,953  $24,651 




aData are from the 2005 American Housing Survey unless otherwise noted. 
bWe label as neighborhood as excellent if the survey respondents gave it a rating of 9 
or 10 on a 1-10 scale. 
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Table 2:  Comparing House Price and Rental Growth 
44 Markets with Continuous Rent Data from REIS, Inc. 
 1980-2006 
 Average  Annual 
Rent Growth 
Average Annual  
Price Growth 
44 Markets   0.51%  1.88% 
San Francisco  1.96%  3.93% 
Boston 2.06%  4.37% 
Los Angeles  1.29%  3.62% 
Atlanta 0.22%  1.06% 
Chicago 0.83%  2.20% 
Phoenix -0.20%  2.19% 
 
Notes:  The rent data are from REIS, Inc.  House price appreciation rates are computed 
from the OFHEO price index.  All data are in real terms. 
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Table 3:  Is Actual Real House Price Appreciation Consistent with Forecasts from a 
User Cost Model? 
Pi,t+n – Pi,t = α + β*(Fi,t+1 – Fi,t) + δ*Yeart + η*MSAi + εi,t
where Pi,t+n – Pt = change in real house prices in market I, and 
Fi,t+1 – Fi,t = one-period change in real house prices forecast by user cost model  
1-year horizon (Pi,t+1 – Pt):  β = -0.81;  n=1119, R
2 = 0.40, cluster by msa 
                                                                                                    (0.22) 
3-year horizon (Pi,t+3 – Pt):  β = -9.60;  n=358, R
2 = 0.57, cluster by msa 
                                                                                                    (0.83) 
5-year horizon (Pi,t+5 – Pt):  β = -14.03;  n=224, R
2 = 0.64, cluster by msa 
                                                                                                     (1.14) 
 
Notes:  Data on user costs were provided by Todd Sinai and are identical to that used in 
Sinai, Mayer, and Himmelberg (2005).  See their paper for the details behind the user 
cost calculation.  See our footnote #8 for details on the calculation of the user cost model 
forecast of real house price changes.  
Table 4:  Estimating the Benefits of Short-Term Predictability 
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th Percentile  -$2,698  -$15,352  -$2,864 
25
th Percentile  -$612  -$8,089  -$775 
50
th Percentile  $2,361  -$3,199  $2,144 
75
th Percentile  $6,163  $112  $5,609 
90
th Percentile  $10,802  $2,179  $9,739 
 
Notes:   
a.)  The underlying specification estimated regresses the one-year, forward-looking change in house prices on a series of observables 
as follows:  Pi,t+1 – Pi,t = α + β*Pi,t + γ*7yrRealRatet + δ*RealGDPt + η*MSAi + εi,t, where Pi,t reflects house price in metropolitan area 
i in year t, 10yrRealRate is the real interest rate on 7-year Treasuries (calculated as in Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005), RealGDP 
is real gross domestic product from the Economic Report of the President, MSAi is a vector of metropolitan area dummies, and ε is the 
standard error term. 
b.)  Net gain from delaying purchase for one year for a renter household with $50,000 in hon-housing wealth and a relative risk 
aversion coefficient equal to 2.  See the discussion in the text for more detail 
c.)  Net gain from delaying sale for one year for an owner household with $250,000 in wealth and a relative risk aversion coefficient 
equal to 2.  See the discussion the text for more detail. 
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Table 5:  Price Changes Within Market Over Time 
Dependent Variable:  Log(Pi,t+j/Pi,t) 
i=metropolitan area i, t=year, j=1, 3, 5 
(9)   Dummies   Year   Dummies    MSA   ) Log(Price      
rice P  
ice Pr  
Log   t 1
t





⎛ + β  
1-year horizon, j=1 
β1=-0.034 (0.013), R
2=0.42, n=1144 
3-year horizon, j=3 
β1=-0.391 (0.047), R
2=0.53, n=1056 




(9’)  Dummies   Year     Dummies    MSA  
Rent
Price



















⎛ + β . 
1-year horizon, j=1 
β2=-0.110 (0.015), R
2=0.46, n=1144 
3-year horizon, j=3 
β2=-0.570 (0.052), R
2=0.53, n=1056 




(9”)  () () Dummies   Year     Dummies     MSA     Rent   Log       Price   Log    
Price
Price  
Log t 4 t 3
t





⎛ + β β . 
1-year horizon, j=1 
β3=-0.101 (0.015), β4=0.199(0.039)  
R
2=0.48, n=1144 
3-year horizon, j=3 
β3=-0.570 (0.052), β4=0.533(0.085)  
R
2=0.59, n=1056 
5-year horizon, j=5 




Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications estimated on 44 metropolitan areas with both OFHEO house price and REIS 
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Figure 1: House Prices and Incomes Across Metropolitan Areas, 2000
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Figure 2: House Prices and Winter Warmth Across Metropolitan Areas, 1990
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Figure 3: 20-Year Changes in House Prices and Incomes, 1980-2000
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